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Working Around the Withdrawal Agreement:
Statutory Evidentiary Safeguards Negate the Need for a
Withdrawal Agreement in Collaborative Law Proceedings*
INTRODUCTION
Jack and Barbara are seeking a divorce after twenty years of mar-
riage. They have two young children and are hoping to avoid the emo-
tional and financial costs of litigation.' After learning of a process
called "collaborative law" from friends who have recently divorced,
Jack and Barbara each hire attorneys who specialize in the collabora-
tive process to handle their divorce. The term "collaborative law"
describes the process in which a husband and wife who are seeking a
divorce along with their attorneys "agree to use their best efforts and
make a good faith attempt to resolve their disputes arising from the
marital relationship on an agreed basis."2 In order to facilitate the pro-
cess, collaborative law requires Jack, Barbara, and their respective
attorneys to sign an agreement in which each party pledges to try in
good faith to resolve their issues without resorting to litigation.3 The
parties themselves, however, do not lose the right to litigate the case.4
Should the parties reach an impasse and decide to litigate, a with-
drawal provision in the collaborative law agreement requires both par-
ties' attorneys to withdraw from the case.5
The negotiations progress well for awhile. Through a series of
"four-way" meetings in which open discovery and free flow of informa-
* The author would like to thank Jean M. Cary, Professor of Law at Campbell
University's Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, and Christopher Fairman,
Professor of Law at The Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law, for their
assistance in the preparation of this Comment for publication.
1. See discussion infra notes 110-12.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71(1) (2007). Although the North Carolina statute only
covers collaborative law in the family law setting, there has been some indication of
the use of collaborative law not just for family law but also for other areas of law. One
professional exalts the process as "an extremely valuable option for family law and
other disputants committed to a civilized, creative, contained, and cost-effective
dispute-resolution process." PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 3-4 (American Bar Association
2001).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71(1) (2007).
4. TESLER, supra note 2, at 7.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-71 to 72 (2007).
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tion air issues,6 Jack, Barbara and their attorneys work toward resolv-
ing their dispute. During this time, Jack and Barbara form close
lawyer-client bonds with their respective attorneys.7 Then, out of
nowhere, the negotiations begin to break down. Jack and Barbara can-
not come to an agreement on child custody rights. Neither party will
budge from his or her position; Barbara decides she would prefer to
litigate the dispute rather than continue unproductive negotiations. In
accordance with the withdrawal agreement, Jack and Barbara's collabo-
rative lawyers withdraw and leave their clients to seek new representa-
tion for anticipated litigation of their dispute. The couple has
exhausted many resources, including money and time, on the collabo-
rative process." They have formed confidential and emotional bonds
with their respective collaborative lawyers. As they move to a more
daunting prospect, litigation, Jack and Barbara must begin again with
new lawyers and a renewed sense of frustration and anguish.
Were it not for the mandatory withdrawal agreement, Jack and
Barbara could continue to be represented by the attorneys who
assisted them in the collaborative process.9 Although it is a relatively
new form of alternative dispute resolution, collaborative law has been
a hot topic among legal ethics scholars in recent years.'0 This Com-
6. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 8 (stating the "hallmarks of the [collaborative]
process [include]: [flull, voluntary, early discovery disclosures" and "[flour-way
settlement meetings as the principal means by which negotiations and
communications take place").
7. See id. at 55-56 (discussing the opening stages of the collaborative process in
which the client and lawyer "forge basic understandings and agreements about how
they will work together" and "the lawyer begins helping the client to identify
substantive goals and priorities"). It may be argued that the lawyer-client bond begins
here and continues to strengthen through the subsequent representation of the client
in the collaborative process.
8. See id. at 18 (estimating the financial costs of the collaborative process).
9. See John Lande & Gregg Herman, Special Issue: Models of Collaboration in
Family Law: Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss: Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law,
or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAm. CT. REV. 280, 281 (2004)
[hereinafter Lande & Herman] (stating that "[c]ooperative law is similar to
collaborative law except that it does not use a disqualification agreement. Lawyers
offer cooperative law to benefit clients who do not want to risk losing their lawyers if
one side chooses to litigate.").
10. See Christopher M. Fairman, Why We Still Need a Model Rule for Collaborative
Law: A Reply to Professor Lande, 22 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 707 (2007) (defending
earlier article proposing a new ethics rule for collaborative law practitioners);
Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Rule for Collaborative Law, 21 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 73 (2005) (discussing the importance of a new ethical rule for collaborative law
practitioners and proposing an example of such a rule); John Lande, Principles for
Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
[Vol. 30:363364
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ment focuses on avoiding the ethical considerations of the withdrawal
agreement in the collaborative process.
Texas and North Carolina lead the movement in collaborative law
legislation." Both states' statutes include comprehensive provisions
covering the definition of collaborative law, the stipulations for the col-
laborative law agreement, the tolling periods for the process, and the
confidentiality provisions protecting the communications and work
product obtained through the collaborative process.12 Although Cali-
fornia's collaborative law statute does not include such comprehensive
provisions at this time, a bill is currently before the California legisla-
ture to enact similar guidelines. 13
Under North Carolina law, "[aill statements, communications,
and work product made or arising from a collaborative law procedure
are confidential and are inadmissible in any court proceeding."'14 Texas
has a similar provision protecting the confidentiality of certain records
or communications made during an alternative dispute resolution pro-
cedure.' 5 Statutes similar to the confidentiality provision provided in
RESOL. 619 (2007) (rebutting Professor Fairman's proposal of a new ethics rule for
collaborative practitioners); Joshua Isaacs, A New Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The
Ethical Implications Surrounding Collaborative Law, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 833 (2005)
(pinpointing major ethical issues surrounding collaborative law as: (1) the
disqualification agreement, (2) informed consent; and (3) zealous advocacy); Brian
Roberson, Comment, Let's Get Together: An Analysis of the Applicability of the Rules of
Professional Conduct to Collaborative Law, 1 U. Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 255 (2007).
11. Currently, only three states in the United States have enacted statutes
specifically dealing with collaborative law. In 2001, Texas was the first state to enact a
collaborative law statute. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon 2006). North
Carolina was second in 2003. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-70 (2007). California's
collaborative law process statute became effective January 1, 2007. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). See also Elizabeth K. Strickland, Putting
"Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job Description: Why More States Should Adopt
Collaborative Law Statues, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979 (2006) (discussing the attributes of
collaborative law statutes and comparing the Texas collaborative law statute with the
North Carolina statute).
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-70 to 79 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603
(Vernon 2006). Texas codified the provision for confidentiality of communications
and information obtained in the collaborative process in 2005. See H.B. 260, 79th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005), 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 916.
13. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); Assemb. 189, 2007-
2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2007).
15. Texas' collaborative law statute cross references Chapter 154 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code applying the provisions for confidentiality of alternative
dispute resolution procedures to collaborative law procedures. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon 2006); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon
2005).
2008]
3
Kuhn: Working Around the Withdrawal Agreement: Statutory Evidentiary Sa
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2008
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Texas' Section 154.073 and North Carolina's Section 50-77 eliminate
the need for a withdrawal agreement. Such provisions provide enough
of an incentive for the lawyers and the parties in a collaborative law
setting to continue negotiating a settlement in good faith in order to
avoid litigation. States with statutory confidentiality provisions should
not require the use of withdrawal agreements in the collaborative law
setting.
This Comment will proceed by: (I) comparing state collaborative
law statutes; (II) evaluating the current ethical climate surrounding
withdrawal agreements in collaborative law; (III) considering the pur-
pose of the withdrawal agreement and how evidentiary safeguards can
provide the same incentives; and finally, concluding that statutory evi-
dentiary safeguards eliminate the need for a mandatory withdrawal
agreement in the collaborative law setting.
I. COMPARISON OF COLLABORATIVE LAW STATUTES 16
At the time of this Comment's publication, only three states have
statutes governing collaborative law proceedings. 17 Texas was the first
to pass a statute providing for collaborative procedure in the family
law context.1 ' North Carolina followed in 200319 and California in
2006.20 Currently, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is drafting a Uniform Collaborative
Law Act (UCLA), which may extend the availability of collaborative
law to other areas of law, beyond family law proceedings.21
Hallmarks of the state collaborative law statutes are: (1) the
requirement of a withdrawal agreement in the definition of collabora-
16. See Strickland, supra note 11, at 990-991 (comparing the Texas and North
Carolina statutes prior to the enactment of the California statute and prior to the
enactment of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(h), governing the protection of
communications during the collaborative process).
17. See TEX. Fjm. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.0072 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to 79 (2007); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
18. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon 2006).
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-70 (2007).
20. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
21. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT §2(c)(1)(A)-(D), Note to Drafting Committee
(Tentative Draft Aug. 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
ucla/oct2007draft.htm. In a note to the drafting committee, found on page fifteen of
the first draft, the Reporter comments that limiting the Uniform Collaborative Law Act
solely to "divorce and family disputes" is "over- and under-inclusi[ve]." Further, it is
"hard to discern a principled policy reason that Collaborative Law should be limited to
a particular type of dispute when other alternative dispute resolution processes such
as mediation and arbitration do not have such substantive law based limitations." Id.
366 [Vol. 30:363
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tive law or collaborative proceeding; and (2) evidentiary safeguards to
prevent the use of work product and communications made during the
collaborative proceeding from being used in subsequent litigation.
Evidentiary safeguards and an agreement between the parties to pro-
ceed with negotiations in good faith provide enough incentive to the
parties and lawyers to continue with the collaborative process and pre-
vent litigation. Such safeguards in conjunction with a good faith agree-
ment to avoid litigation preclude the need for an agreement between
the parties and counsel for the withdrawal of collaborative counsel
should negotiations fail.
A. Requirement of Withdrawal Agreement
According to seasoned collaborative law attorneys, the withdrawal
agreement is the "irreducible minimum condition for calling what you
do 'collaborative law."' 22 This withdrawal agreement mandates that
"you [as collaborative counsel for one party] and the counsel for the
other party must sign papers disqualifying you from ever appearing in
court on behalf of either of these clients against the other. ' 23 Two of
the states have included the requirement of the withdrawal agreement
in their statutory definition of a "collaborative law agreement. '24 Cali-
fornia's collaborative law statute does not currently include a require-
ment for a written agreement for the withdrawal of the attorneys in the
collaborative process.2 5
Although the California statute does not mandate a withdrawal
agreement between collaborative law participants and their attorneys,
it may be coming soon. At this time, the note to the California statute
expresses the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation during the
2007-2008 legislative session to "provide a procedural framework for
22. TESLER, supra note 2, at 6.
23. Id.
24. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(c)(4) (Vernon 2006) (requiring that a
"collaborative law agreement must include provisions for ... withdrawal of all counsel
involved in the collaborative law procedure if the collaborative law procedure does not
result in settlement of the dispute"); See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-71(1) (2007)
(requiring that the collaborative law "procedure shall also include an agreement where
the parties' attorneys agree not to serve as litigation counsel, except to ask the court to
approve the settlement agreement").
25. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (defining "collaborative
law process" as "the process in which the parties and any professionals engaged by the
parties to assist them agree in writing to use their best efforts and to make a good faith
attempt to resolve disputes related to the family law matters as referenced in
subdivision (a) on an agreed basis without resorting to adversary judicial
intervention").
20081 367
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the practice of collaborative law."' 26 Currently, there is a bill before the
California Assembly that would prohibit a collaborative attorney from
representing a party to the collaborative process in subsequent litiga-
tion.27 Therefore, although the bill has not yet been passed, the
requirement of a withdrawal agreement in the California Collaborative
Family Law Act is a future possibility.
The addition of the withdrawal agreement to the UCLA has been
met with some discussion.28 The Reporter of the UCLA summarized
the debate by stating "[w]hile the provision that counsel sign the
Agreement is consistent with current Collaborative Law Practice . . . it
also potentially creates the impression that counsel for one party is
assuming a legal or ethical duty to the other party. '29 If the drafting
committee later determines that the provision requiring the with-
drawal agreement should not be added, the drafting committee will
have to revise the Prefatory Note and sections of the Act that assume
the practice of counsel signing such an agreement should continue.30
B. Discovery and Evidentiary Provisions
North Carolina's Collaborative Law Proceedings Statute Section
50-77 provides, "[aIll statements, communications, and work product
made or arising from a collaborative law procedure are confidential
and are inadmissible in any court proceeding. '31 The definition of
work product in this context includes "any written or verbal communi-
26. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
27. Assemb. 189, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2007), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab 0151-0200/ab 189_bill 20070125
introduced.pdf.
28. According to the notes to the drafting committee included with § 2(b) in the
first draft of the Uniform Act, "[t]he practice of counsel signing the Participation
Agreement was ... the subject of much discussion at the Committee's first meeting."
The first draft's minimum requirements included a "Collaborative Law Participation
Agreement," which must include the stipulation that "[c]ounsel for all Parties must
withdraw from further representation if the Collaborative Law Process is terminated
.UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(b)(1)(B) (Tentative Draft Aug. 2007), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/oct2007draft.htm. The Interim
Draft of the UCLA, dated December 2007, also includes the requirement of the
withdrawal agreement. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 3(b)(7) (Tentative Draft
Dec. 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/
2007dec interim.htm.
29. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(b) note to drafting committee (Tentative
Draft Aug. 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/
oct2007draft.htm.
30. See id.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77(a) (2007).
368 [Vol. 30:363
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cations or analysis of any third-party experts used in the collaborative
law procedure. 32 Such a requirement effectively prevents the parties
from using any information obtained from the collaborative process in
subsequent litigation.33 Texas has a similar provision for confidential-
ity of communications in the collaborative law context. 34 At this time,
California has not followed suit with a statute covering evidentiary
safeguards in the collaborative process.3 5 However, during the current
legislative period (2007-2008), the drafting committee for the Califor-
nia Collaborative Family Law Act has proposed amendments to the
California Evidence Code that would include safeguarding communi-
cations between participants made during the collaborative law
process.36
The first draft of the UCLA includes a provision which states "a
Collaborative Law Communication is privileged ... and is not subject
to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding unless waived or
precluded .... ", To protect otherwise admissible evidence, another
provision provides that "[e]vidence or information that is otherwise
admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or
protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or use in the
Collaborative Law Process. '38 Thus, information that would not be
discoverable under the conventional rules of evidence, but is
exchanged between the parties in the collaborative setting may not be
used in subsequent litigation. Other information gained during the
collaborative proceeding may be used in subsequent litigation, but it
must be gained through conventional discovery methods, such as
party admissions, interrogatories, etc.39
A statutory provision protecting the information exchanged dur-
ing the collaborative process provides the "confidentiality of communi-
32. § 50-77(a). Subsection (b) of the statute continues stating, "[aill
communications and work product of any attorney or third-party expert hired for
purposes of participating in a collaborative law procedure shall be privileged and
inadmissible in any court proceeding, except by agreement of the parties." § 50-77(b).
33. See § 50-77(b).
34. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603(h) (Vernon 2006); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon 2005).
35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
36. Assemb. 189, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2007), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bll/asm/abO151-0200/ab_189_bill_20070125_introduced.
pdf.
37. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 7(a) (Tentative Draft Aug. 2007), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/oct2O7draft.htm.
38. Id. § 7(c).
39. See id. § 7 cmt.
2008] 369
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cations [which] is central to the Collaborative Law Process. '40 By
protecting the information exchanged during the collaborative pro-
ceedings, the statute provides a procedural incentive for the parties to
continue negotiations until settlement. Also, such a provision creates a
trusting atmosphere for clients, facilitating open disclosure.41
1. Procedural Incentive to Continue Negotiations
Clients and attorneys alike put a lot of effort and time into the
collaborative process. The entire procedure involves multiple four-way
meetings, brainstorming solutions to disputed issues, shared informa-
tion, emotional upset, and proposals and approval of agreements.42 In
jurisdictions with evidentiary safeguards, all the work accomplished in
the collaborative proceeding would be lost should the dispute go to
litigation.43 The mere prospect of starting from scratch and rehashing
the issues that have been handled in the collaborative proceeding
would be a daunting task. Having to use conventional methods of dis-
covery to provide the same information necessary for litigation, the
parties would expend even more time and expense in addition to what
they have already spent on the collaborative proceeding.44 When par-
ties reach an impasse on a particular issue or multiple issues, reflec-
tion on all that has been accomplished should provide both parties
and lawyers alike with an incentive to continue to negotiate in good
faith and prevent the dispute from moving into the courtroom. Addi-
tionally, the process of obtaining all of the information made available
through the collaborative process by conventional discovery methods
acts as an incentive to continue negotiating.
2. Protecting Clients While Facilitating Open Disclosure
Statutory provisions providing evidentiary safeguards in the col-
laborative process protect the clients from potential misuse or reuse of
40. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, Prefatory Note (Tentative Draft Aug. 2007),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/oct2OO7draft.htm.
41. See Strickland, supra note 11, at 1010 (discussing the attributes of a statutory
provision protecting communications during the collaborative process).
42. See generally TESLER, supra note 2, at 55-76 (discussing the stages of the
collaborative law process).
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon
2006); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon 2005).
44. See generally David A. Hoffman, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner's Perspective,
4 COLLABORATIVE L. J., Winter 2006, at 1, 3 (discussing the necessity for collaborative
attorneys to advise clients of limited means of the financial risks involved with the
collaborative process should negotiations fail).
[Vol. 30:363
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information shared during the collaborative proceeding.45 The typical
collaborative proceeding is made up of multiple "four-way" meetings in
which the parties attempt to settle their dispute.4 6 "Four-way" meeting
is the term used by collaborative professionals to refer to the negotia-
tions that "take place in the presence of and with the active involve-
ment of all four participants," two attorneys representing two clients
respectively. '47 Because the clients and attorneys know beforehand
that all information and communication from the process is privi-
leged, unless otherwise discoverable, the clients will feel protected and
safe while disclosing information. 48 Thus, the goal of "full, voluntary,
early disclosures" is fulfilled.49
Some legal scholars argue that the withdrawal agreement is the
imperative requirement discouraging litigation. 0 The withdrawal
agreement includes the binding requirement that the attorneys for
both parties will withdraw should the negotiations fail and the dispute
move to the courtroom. 5' Therefore, collaborative practitioners claim
that the attorneys representing the parties in the collaborative setting
will not consider litigation as an option and thus the settlement discus-
sions are moved forward in a problem-solving method. 2 A statutory
provision such as North Carolina's Section 50-77 may actually do
more to assuage the parties' apprehensions concerning disclosure of
information. 3 Rather than employing an agreement preventing the
lawyers from representing the clients in subsequent litigation, the par-
ties should be made aware of the statutory protections mandating that
45. UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT, Prefatory Note (Tentative Draft Aug. 2007),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/oct2007draft.htm;
Strickland, supra note 11, at 1010.
46. TESLER, supra note 2, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Strickland, supra note 11, at 1010. See generally UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT,
Prefatory Note (Tentative Draft Aug. 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/archives/ulc/ucla/oct2OO7draft.htm (stating "[w]ithout assurances that
communications made during the Collaborative Law Process will not be used to their
detriment later, parties, their counsel and experts will be reluctant to speak frankly,
test out ideas and proposals, or freely exchange information").
49. TESLER, supra note 2, at 8.
50. See id. at 6; Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.
317, 320 (2004); Gary L. Voegele, Linda K. Wright & Ronald D. Ousky, Collaborative
Law: A Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 971, 978 (2007) [hereinafter Voegele].
51. TESLER, supra note 2, at 6.
52. See id. at 13-14.
53. See Strickland, supra note 11, at 1010.
20081
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the communications and work product arising from the collaborative
procedure may not be used against them should the dispute go to trial.
II. CURRENT ETHICAL CLIMATE SURROUNDING COLLABORATIVE LAW
While the withdrawal agreement has been overwhelmingly sup-
ported by collaborative law practitioners,54 it has been met with some
debate and criticism by legal scholars and one state bar association.
55
The year 2007 was a particularly tumultuous year for the practice of
collaborative law in the realm of professional responsibility and ethical
considerations. 56  Although its supporters vehemently oppose the
insinuation that the withdrawal agreement creates an ethical issue
between the collaborative attorney and the client,5 7 the debate and crit-
icism of the withdrawal agreement supports an investigation into alter-
natives. This Comment proposes that the need for a withdrawal
agreement between the attorney and client in the collaborative setting
is obviated by statutory safeguards that protect information and work
product arising from the collaborative proceeding. Before exploring the
ways in which evidentiary safeguards provide the equivalent benefits to
the collaborative process as the withdrawal agreement, it is necessary
to discuss why the withdrawal agreement is ethically in question in the
first place.
54. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 6; Tesler, supra note 50, at 320; Voegele, supra note
50, at 978.
55. See Colo. Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (Feb. 24, 2007) available at http:/
/www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/10159/CETH/Ethics-Opinion-115; UNIF.
COLIABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(b) Note to Drafting Committee (Tentative Draft Aug.
2007); Lande & Herman, supra note 9, at 283-284 (stating that "[alithough parties
may feel that the disqualification agreement protects against pressure from the threat
of litigation, some may feel heavy pressure to accept agreements that they believe are
not in their interests."); Isaacs, supra note 10, at 838 (discussing the ethical
implications of the withdrawal agreement).
56. In February 2007, the Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Committee issued an
advisory opinion concerning the practice of collaborative law. It held that when
attorneys representing the two parties enter into a binding agreement to withdraw if
settlement negotiations fail and the case moves to litigation, the agreement is per se
unethical. Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 55, at 4.
57. See IACP Ethics Task Force, The Ethics of the Collaborative Participation
Agreement: A Critique of Colorado's Maverick Ethics Opinion (2007) available at
www.collaborativepractice.com/documents/IACPEthicsTaskForcearticle.pdf
[hereinafter IACP Critique].
[Vol. 30:363
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A. Colorado Bar Ethics Committee Opinion and the Aftermath
Colorado, like many states across the country, has experienced
great development in the practice of collaborative law.58 It was in
response to such "rapid growth" that the Colorado Bar Ethics Commit-
tee decided to review the practice 9 and in February 2007 issued an
advisory opinion decrying the withdrawal agreement which, as previ-
ously discussed, collaborative practitioners believe to be the heart of
the collaborative process.6 ° Other states have considered the issue in
recent years and have found that the withdrawal agreement does not
violate their respective state codes of ethics. 61 Although the Colorado
Bar Association was the first and, currently, the only state to claim that
the withdrawal agreement is unethical,62 in the past few years legal
scholars and drafters of collaborative law statutes have pondered the
ethics of the withdrawal agreement.63
The Colorado Bar Ethics Committee determined: (1) collaborative
law is per se unethical but a procedure called "cooperative law" is not;
(2) the withdrawal agreement presents a non-waivable conflict of inter-
est under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct;64 and (3) the
58. See Voegele, supra note 50, at 973-974 (discussing the development and
proliferation of collaborative law). See also Jill Schachner Chanen, A Warning to
Collaborators: Colorado Bar Ethics Panel Takes Aim at a Growing ADR Practice, A.B.A. J.,
at 22 (May 2007) (stating that collaborative law is "[olne of the most rapidly
expanding forms of alternative dispute resolution in family law").
59. Chanen, supra note 58, at 22.
60. See Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 55.
61. See generally NJ. Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op.
699 (2005); N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1 (2002) (finding that a lawyer
may ask a client to agree in advance to limiting the lawyers representation in the
collaborative family law process and to withdraw from representation prior to court
proceedings); Ky. Bar Assoc. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. KBA E-425 (2005) (finding
that the client must be fully informed of the collaborative lawyer's limited
representation and the consequences of withdrawal); Pa. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Legal
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2004-24 (2004).
62. IACP Critique, supra note 57.
63. See discussion, supra note 10.
64. Under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, a client may consent to a
lawyer's representation although the representation of such client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to a third person. CoLo. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1997). The Colorado Bar Ethics Committee found a conflict of
interest to exist in the collaborative law setting because the withdrawal agreement
between the parties' attorneys is an express agreement by each attorney to "impair his
or her ability to represent the client." Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 55, at 2. In
concluding, the Committee found that a client may not consent to this conflict because
" the possibility that a conflict will materialize is significant" and "the potential
conflict inevitably interferes with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
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parties participating in the collaborative process may contract with
each other to hire new attorneys should the collaborative negotiations
fail. 65  The International Academy of Collaborative Professionals
(IACP) 66 responded with a harsh critique of Colorado's "maverick
opinion."" The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association also replied with its
own formal opinion.68
1. Collaborative Law v. Cooperative Law
According to the Colorado Bar Ethics Committee, cooperative law
is a movement of alternative dispute resolution that is similar in almost
every way to collaborative law except that it does not require a with-
drawal agreement. 69 Because the committee found only the with-
drawal agreement to be unethical under the Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct, the absence of such an agreement in the cooper-
ative process eliminates the ethical violation.7" The committee con-
cluded that an agreement embodying all the principles of collaborative
law, but omitting the withdrawal agreement, did not violate the rules
because "those obligations do not materially limit or interfere with the
lawyer's ability to represent the client.
71
Neither the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility nor the IACP chose to address the cooperative law pro-
considering the alternative of litigation in a material way." Id. Thus, according to the
Committee, the withdrawal agreement presents a non-waivable conflict of interest.
65. Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 55.
66. The International Academy of Collaborative Professionals is "an international
community of legal, mental health and financial professionals working in concert to
create client-centered processes for resolving conflict" through the collaborative
process. See About IACP, http://www.collaborativepractice.com/_t.asp?M=3&T=New-
About (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
67. The IACP titled its response to Colorado Opinion 115 "The Ethics of the
Collaborative Participation Agreement: A Critique of Colorado's Maverick Ethics
Opinion." IACP Critique, supra note 57.
68. A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Resp., Formal Op. 07-447 (2007)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 07-447].
69. The Colorado Bar Ethics Committee found that cooperative law "includes a
written agreement to make full, voluntary disclosure of all financial information, avoid
formal discovery procedures, utilize joint rather than unilateral appraisals, and use
interest-based negotiation." Thus, cooperative law is "identical to Collaborative Law,
with the exception of the disqualification agreement." Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra
note 55, at 4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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cess.7 2 Perhaps the IACP chose not to address the issue of cooperative
law because the IACP is an organization that deals exclusively with
"collaborative practice. ' 73 In its mission statement, the IACP advo-
cates "protecting the essentials of Collaborative Practice."74 Under
another area of the IACP website, the IACP includes the withdrawal
agreement as a "key element" to the collaborative practice. 75 The ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility also
chose to be silent on the issue of cooperative law, and stated the pur-
pose of Formal Opinion 07-447 as "analyz[ing] the implications of the
Model Rules on collaborative law practice."76 While the ABA may have
focused its opinion solely on collaborative law because of the discus-
sion the Colorado opinion has caused in the collaborative law commu-
nity, it may have chosen to avoid discussing cooperative law because it
is a newer, smaller movement within the alternative dispute resolution
realm.77
2. Withdrawal Agreement as a Non-Waivable Conflict
Citing Rule 1.7(b) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Con-
duct,78 the Colorado Bar Ethics Committee determined that the with-
drawal agreement "implicated" the Rule and in so doing violated
subsection (c) of Rule 1.7. 7 9 The opinion provided "the client's con-
sent to a conflict 'cannot be validly obtained in those instances in
72. See IACP Critique, supra note 57; Formal Op. 07-447, supra note 68.
73. About IACP, supra note 67.
74. Id.
75. International Academy of Collaborative Professionals, http://
www.collaborativepractice.com/-FAQs.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2007). Although it is
named as a "key element" on one part of the website, the withdrawal agreement may be
seen as an "essential" of collaborative law. In its critique of the Colorado opinion, the
IACP extols the "collaborative commitment" which includes the withdrawal agreement
as "essential" to the collaborative process. IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 2.
76. Formal Op. 07-447, supra note 68, at 1.
77. One collaborative lawyer practicing in Colorado lamented about the Colorado
decision and stated that cooperative law is "not something that anyone in Colorado
does and any one of us knows what it is supposed to be." Chanen, supra note 58.
Additionally, Lande and Herman state that "[t]he cooperative law movement is much
smaller than the collaborative law movement." Lande & Herman, supra note 9, at 284.
78. The Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee found that the withdrawal
agreement used in collaborative law violates Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct
1.7(b) which states "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after
consultation." COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1997).
79. Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 55, at 1.
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which a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not
agree to the representation under the circumstances of the particular
situation.""'8 The committee found that although a client may consent
to a limited representation by his or her respective attorney, the client
in a collaborative process may not consent to the withdrawal agree-
ment in the collaborative law setting because: (1) it is highly probable
that a conflict of interest will occur; (2) the probability of such a con-
flict "interferes with the lawyer's independent professional judgment
in considering the alternative of litigation in a material way;" and (3)
the fact that the client hires another lawyer when the negotiations fail
is "irrelevant. ' 81 In concluding, the committee found that the collabo-
rative process is "particularly susceptible to abuse" because the with-
drawal agreement mandates that the parties' respective attorneys
withdraw in the face of litigation "regardless of the good or bad faith
participation of any party to the process. 82 Simply stated, the Colo-
rado Bar finds it problematic that when negotiations fail the attorneys
must withdraw regardless of the good or bad faith of either of the par-
ties, and even though the parties may consent to limited representa-
tion, the conflicts arising from the withdrawal agreement are non-
waivable.
Criticizing the narrow scope of the Colorado opinion, the IACP
stated the rule in Colorado, under which the alleged ethical violation
would be made by an attorney signing a withdrawal agreement in the
collaborative process, is not found in any other state's Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility or Rules of Ethics.8 3 Although the IACP argued
that the Colorado rule is dissimilar to other state rules, at least one
legal commentator has expressed caution for attorneys practicing col-
laborative law in her state because of the similarity between Colorado's
rules of ethics and the rules of ethics in force in her jurisdiction.8 4
Additionally, IACP and the ABA Standing Committee argued that
the Colorado opinion cannot be squared with the client's right to limit
the scope of his or her attorney's representation under Model Rule 1.2
and similar state rules.85 Model Rule 1.2 allows an attorney to limit the
scope of representation if "the limitation is reasonable under the cir-
80. Id. (quoting CoLo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(c) (1997)).
81. Colo. Formal Op. 115, supra note 55, at 3.
82. Id.
83. See IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 2.
84. See Mary Anne Decaria, Family Law Column: Ethics and the Practice of
Collaborative Law, 15 NEV. LAWYER 44 Uuly 2007)., available at http://www.nvbar.org/
publications/Nevada%2OLawyer%20Magazine/2007/July/family.htm
85. See IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 3; Formal Op. 07-447, supra note 68, at 3.
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cumstances and the client gives informed consent. '8 6 ABA Formal
Opinion 07-447 states that "if the client has given his or her informed
consent, the lawyer may represent the client in the collaborative pro-
cess."87 In so concluding, the ABA Standing Committee agreed with
the IACP that the withdrawal agreement, or "four-way agreement," is a
method to provide "a permissible limited scope representation under
Model Rule 1.2."88 Also, the Standing Committee repudiated the idea
that the withdrawal agreement creates a non-waivable conflict under
the Model Rules.89
3. Contracting to Terminate Attorneys Between Parties
Although the Ethics Committee of the Colorado Bar Association
found that the "four way" agreement between the clients and their
respective lawyers is per se unethical, the Committee determined in a
footnote that the parties could contract between themselves to agree to
terminate their respective collaborative lawyers should the negotia-
tions fail. 9° In other words, the husband and wife may sign an agree-
ment with each other stating that in the event the collaborative process
does not end in a settlement, they will agree to terminate their current
representation and hire different attorneys when the case moves for-
ward into litigation. The Ethics Committee agreed that this method of
terminating the collaborative representation alleviates the ethical prob-
lem of the withdrawal agreement because the collaborative lawyer
would not be a party to such a contract.9 ' Such an agreement would
not produce the conflict that the Committee presumed arises between
the collaborative lawyer and his or her client in the collaborative pro-
cess when a withdrawal agreement is in effect. 92 Thus, the Committee
found that an agreement between the husband and wife to terminate
their respective collaborative lawyers "promote[s] the valid purposes of
Collaborative Law."
9 3
86. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002).
87. Formal Op. 07-447, supra note 68, at 1.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id.
90. See Colo. Bar Ethics Comm., supra note 56, at 9, n.11.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The Committee determined that the "valid purposes of Collaborative Law
include creating incentives for settlement, generating a positive environment for
negotiation, and fostering a continued relationship between the parties without
violating the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct." Id.
20081 377
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According to the IACP, this footnote has effectively saved the prac-
tice of collaborative law in the state of Colorado.94 Because of this
loophole, the IACP argues that the reasoning of the Colorado opinion
is "unpersuasive." 95  By allowing the private parties to contract
between themselves to terminate their respective attorneys should
negotiations fail, the IACP argues that Colorado is not actually alleviat-
ing the ethical problem. 96 In fact, the IACP found that under the Colo-
rado opinion a client may make an agreement with the opposing party
in which the two would terminate their respective collaborative attor-
neys and then also make an agreement with his or her respective attor-
ney in which the client agreed to limit the attorney's representation
solely to collaborative negotiations.97 Such a proposition, according to
the IACP, is "a highly technical and mechanical approach to the ques-
tion."9 The ABA Standing Committee opinion did not address the
notion of contracting between the two parties to terminate their
respective lawyers should the negotiations in the collaborative proceed-
ing fail.
B. Reflecting on the Dispute
While the scope of the Colorado opinion may not have a broad
reach, 99 it brings the ethical issues surrounding the withdrawal agree-
ment to the forefront of the discussion of collaborative law. For exam-
ple, NCCUSL's drafting committee for the UCLA in its first meeting
did not resolve the issue of whether to include a provision mandating
the withdrawal agreement. 100 The Reporter of the UCLA noted in the
first draft of the Act that the provision for the withdrawal agreement
was "the subject of much discussion" at the first meeting. 10 ' Citing the
94. See IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 1. However, some collaborative attorneys
worry that the "two-way agreement" between the parties "guts the collaborative
process and morphs into cooperative law." Chanen, supra note 58.
95. See IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 2-3 n.6.
96. The IACP found "the committee's focus on the fact that the Participation
Agreement is signed by both lawyers and both clients is a highly technical and
mechanical approach to the question .... How clients' interests are protected by such a
hairsplitting view of ethics is not clear." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. The IACP noted that the Colorado opinion is limited in scope by the fact that
Association membership is not compulsory, the opinion is the only of its kind, and the
opinion itself is labeled "advisory." Id. at 2.
100. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 2(b), Note to Drafting Committee
(Tentative Draft Aug. 2007).
101. Id.
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Colorado Ethics Opinion, the Reporter stated that the withdrawal
agreement "potentially creates the impression that counsel for one
party is assuming a legal or ethical duty to the other party." 102 There-
fore, the Colorado Ethics Opinion may be more influential than the
IACP postulated.
10 3
At any rate, the current ethical climate surrounding the with-
drawal agreement in the collaborative process highlights the idea that
practitioners and lawmakers should look to other safeguards to pro-
vide the same incentives as the withdrawal agreement. While propo-
nents of the withdrawal agreement vehemently support it as the
"irreducible minimum" of the collaborative process, 10 4 this notion
turns a blind eye to other safeguards that may be just as important in
facilitating the collaborative process without invoking a potential ethi-
cal conundrum.
III. THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT AND EVIDENTIARY SAFEGUARDS
In addition to being the "irreducible minimum" of the collabora-
tive process,'0 5 the withdrawal agreement according to collaborative
law practitioners brings about a "paradigm shift" in the way the collab-
orative lawyer thinks and solves problems. 10 6 The "paradigm shift" is
a metamorphosis from the litigator-mode of representation to the col-
laborative-mode of representation. 10 7 Collaborative law practitioners
agree that this shift is essential to effective negotiation and dispute res-
olution strategy in the collaborative process.'0 8 By removing the possi-
bility of litigation, the collaborative attorney must come up with other,
102. Id.
103. In the Interim Draft of the UCLA, the drafting committee retained the
requirement of the withdrawal agreement, resolving the debate over whether to include
the mandatory withdrawal agreement in the tentative draft of the statute. See UNIF.
COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 3(c)(1)(H) (Tentative Draft Dec. 2007).
104. TESLER, supra note 2, at 6.
105. Id.
106. IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 2; Voegele, supra note 50, at 983. See TESLER,
supra note 2, at 13-14, 16 (describing the effects of the binding agreements that are
made at the beginning of the collaborative process).
107. Tesler sets out four stages of the paradigm shift, which include: (1) "retooling
yourself"; (2) "retooling with your client"; (3) "retooling with the other players"; and
(4) "retooling negotiations." TESLER, supra note 2, at 38-39. Tesler's theory is that
signing the withdrawal agreement begins the process of freeing a former litigator from
considering litigation as an option in dispute resolution and opens the attorney up to
more creative solutions. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 16.
108. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 13-14, 16; IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 2;
Voegele, supra note 50, at 983.
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more creative solutions to the problem at hand. 109 Litigation, espe-
cially in family law settings, can leave great emotional scars on the
parties and the children involved in the dispute." 0 It is well docu-
mented that children whose parents have gone through the traditional
divorce process are more likely to have trouble at school, encounter
drinking or drug problems, and are more likely to become sexually
promiscuous."' The goal of collaborative law is to avoid the problems
associated with litigation in divorce cases by taking the option of litiga-
tion off the table." 2 By creating a more open and productive environ-
ment, the collaborative process allows the divorcing parents to focus
on the interests of the children rather than on who triumphs in the
courtroom. 113
The withdrawal agreement, however, is not the only tool that may
be used to initiate a "paradigm shift" in the mind of the former litigator
turned collaborative lawyer. Statutory evidentiary safeguards may pro-
vide the same incentives as the withdrawal agreement by effectively
removing litigation as an option. A statutory provision, such as the one
found in Section 50-77 of the North Carolina General Statutes, could
provide the foundation for such incentives.
A. Purported Incentives of the Withdrawal Agreement
Typically, collaborative law agreements require a writing which is
"signed by all of the parties to the agreement and their attorneys, and
must include provisions for the withdrawal of all attorneys involved in
the collaborative law procedure if the collaborative law procedure does
109. See generally TESLER, supra note 2, at 17 (stating "[blecause there is no
successful option available for the collaborative lawyers other than thinking their way
to a solution, solutions can ... sometimes be crafted out of the most unwieldy
elements").
110. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 1-2 (describing the effects of litigation in divorce);
Marsha B. Freeman & James D. Hauser, Making Divorce Work: Teaching a Mental
Health/Legal Paradigm to a Multidisciplinary Student Body, 6 BARRY L. REv. 1, 3 (2006)
(finding "[tihe impetus for th[e] movement towards a goal of non-litigious settlement
include[d] . . . discontent for the effects of the litigation on the parties ....");
Strickland, supra note 11, at 980; Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP.
Disp. RESOL. L.J. 317 (2004) (citing Hon. Donna J. Hitchens as stating, "[tihe least
litigious alternative is always going to be better for families").
111. Freeman & Hauser, supra note 110, at 1-2.
112. See generally TESLER, supra note 2, at 3-4 (describing the benefits of
collaborative law in contrast to the disadvantages of mediation and litigation).
113. Id. at 4; Freeman & Hauser, supra note 110, at 6; Carrie D. Helmcamp,
Collaborative Family Law: A Means to a Less Destructive Divorce, 70 TEx. B.J. 196
(2007); Tesler, supra note 50, at 322.
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not result in settlement of the dispute." '14 Many benefits are said to
arise from this withdrawal provision.' 15 Among the many cited incen-
tives provided by the withdrawal agreement," 16 three are predominant:
(1) the withdrawal agreement aligns the interests of the parties and
their respective attorneys;" 7 (2) it allows the parties and attorneys to
open up to creative resolutions to the problems or issues involved in
the case;'1 8 and (3) the withdrawal agreement provides a "container"
for negotiations. 11 9
1. Aligning the Interests of the Parties
Although it would seem that any type of agreement could be made
to align the interests of the parties involved,' 2 ° collaborative practition-
ers agree that the withdrawal agreement serves as a tool to bring both
the husband and wife and their respective lawyers together for a com-
mon purpose.' 2 ' The interests involved in the collaborative process
may vary from couple to couple; however, a sampling of such issues
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-72 (2007).
115. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 10 (citing benefits such as (1) "[d]ynamic legal
advice"; (2) "[s]easoned negotiators bring[ing] their respective experience and skill ...
to bear upon the process"; (3) "[flour minds engage[d] in 'real-time' creative problem
solving"); Voegele, supra note 50, at 979-983 (describing the "rationale for the
disqualification agreement" as three-fold: (1) enhancing the commitment of the
lawyers and the parties involved; (2) creating a safe environment for the negotiation
and settlement discussions; and (3) "resolv[ing] the prisoner's dilemma to increase
cooperation").
116. Id.
117. Hoffman, supra note 44, at 3. See also TESLER, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that
"everyone agrees in advance that win-win solutions are the preferred goal and a
measure of lawyer success . . ."); Voegele, supra note 50, at 979 (stating "the
disqualification agreement ... secures the settlement commitment earlier in the
process").
118. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 17 (stating "[b]ecause there is no successful option
available for the collaborative lawyers other than thinking their way to a solution,
solutions can . . .sometimes be crafted out of the most unwieldy elements"); IACP
Critique, supra note 57, at 2 (citing the withdrawal agreement as "essential [to the
promotion of] . . . interest-based, problem-solving negotiations").
119. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 78 (defining the "container" as "the invisible
structure . . .that holds the clients and lawyers together in a working collaborative
team," which consists minimally of the withdrawal agreement); Hoffman, supra note
44, at 3 (stating that "the disqualification provision lies at the heart of collaborative
law because it ... creates a safe container for settlement discussion"); Voegele, supra
note 50, at 980.
120. An agreement to negotiate in good faith and avoid litigation could also further
the clients' interest in avoiding litigation. Collaborative practitioners include such
provisions already in the preliminary agreements. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 13.
121. See TESLER, supra note 2.
20081
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includes: removing the prospect of litigation as an option for dispute
resolution; 122 effecting a positive resolution to child custody and prop-
erty issues; 123 and completing the process of leaving the children rela-
tively unscathed by the ordeal.' 24 To initiate the collaborative process,
both husband and wife have to agree that they will make a good faith
effort to settle and avoid litigation. 125 It is the withdrawal agreement,
collaborative lawyers argue, that reminds the parties of their aligned
interests and promotes an incentive to further those interests when the
negotiations hit a rough patch.'
2 6
2. Opening the Parties to Creative Solutions
During the collaborative process, practitioners argue they are able
to reach creative solutions because they may not assist their respective
clients in litigation. 127 Collaborative attorneys argue that in taking the
possibility of litigation off the negotiation table through the with-
drawal agreement, they are forced to brainstorm new options for their
clients and come up with unconventional ways of solving problems. 128
In effect, such creative solutions lead to a greater sense of individual
satisfaction for the couple because they arrive at a workable compro-
mise rather than allowing a third party, such as a judge, to issue an
order. 129 Also, it has been argued that the collaborative lawyer, by tak-
ing away the option of trial, has more clarity to explore alternatives
that he or she would fail to see when distracted by preparations for
trial. 13' Essentially, collaborative lawyers argue that if they have the
122. TESLER, supra note 2, at 13.
123. See Voegele, supra note 50, at 985.
124. See Freeman & Hauser, supra note 110, at 2.
125. TESLER, supra note 2, at 13.
126. Id. at 16.
127. According to Tesler, "[tihe clear commitment by everyone that decisions will
not ordinarily be made by any third party dramatically alters how each participant
engages in negotiations: each participant, whether lawyer or client, bears the personal
responsibility from the start for generating creative alternatives that might meet the
legitimate needs of both parties." Id. Thus, the alignment of interests advanced by the
disqualification agreement facilitates solutions to the disputed issues in the
collaborative process.
128. Id. at 17.
129. This is known as the "win-win" agreement wherein the lawyers "bring about a
mutually satisfactory settlement of all issues." Id. at 15 (comparing the lawyer's
"traditional adversarial representation" and the lawyer's "collaborative
representation"). See also Voegele, supra note 50, at 974 (discussing collaborative
lawyers' "motivat[ion] to develop win-win settlement skills such as those practiced in
mediation").
130. IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 4.
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idea of litigation in the back of their minds, it will taint their ability to
come up with alternative solutions in the collaborative process.
13 1
3. Providing a "Container" for Negotiations
The "container-setting" is described by one collaborative law prac-
titioner as the situation "whe[re] collaborative lawyers work skillfully
together and with their respective clients to clarify, restate, reinforce,
and apply the specific process agreements." 132 Collaborative practi-
tioners argue the environment becomes a "safe container" after the par-
ties sign the withdrawal agreement.' 33 Therefore, the withdrawal
agreement facilitates the free and open disclosure of information lead-
ing to an effective resolution of the dispute. Because the parties have
agreed to negotiate in good faith and have the added incentive of the
withdrawal agreement to prevent litigation, they feel "safe" in disclos-
ing information that would otherwise be privileged or particularly
damaging to their side of the issue. 1 34 Thus, the withdrawal agreement
creates a bubble around the parties and their respective attorneys in
which no one outside of the process may become apprised of the
exchanged information. Since the parties and their attorneys have
eliminated litigation as an option through the agreement, the parties
can freely divulge information to reach an agreement knowing that
such information will not be used against him or her later.
135
B. Evidentiary Safeguards Promote the Same Incentives
As discussed in Section I of this Comment, two states currently
include statutory provisions protecting the work-product and informa-
tion exchanged during the collaborative process. North Carolina's Col-
laborative Law Proceedings Act provides specifically that "all
statements, communications, and work product made or arising from
a collaborative law procedure are confidential and are inadmissible in
131. See Lande & Herman, supra note 9, at 283 (stating "[piroponents [of the
disqualification agreement] say that lawyers are so used to litigating that at the first
sign of disagreement, many lawyers would quickly threaten legal action if not
precluded from doing so by an enforceable mechanism like the disqualification
agreement"); Tesler, supra note 50, at 320-21 (stating that "internal and external
factors coincide in favor of inducing traditional litigation-matrix lawyers to abort
negotiations in the face of impasse where court is an option").
132. TESLER, supra note 2, at 60 n.5.
133. See Hoffman, supra note 44, at 3.
134. See Voegele, supra note 50, at 980 ("In traditional negotiations, a client who
openly shares information and immediately comes forward with his or her best
proposals can be exploited if the other party does not reciprocate.").
135. Id.
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any court proceeding."' 36 Only if the parties agree to the use of com-
munications and work product of a collaborative attorney or third
party expert, may such materials be used in a subsequent proceed-
ing.' 37 While collaborative law practitioners uphold the withdrawal
agreement as the linchpin of the collaborative process, 138 it is arguable
that the evidentiary safeguards in such statutes present the same
incentives provided by the withdrawal agreement. Thus, evidentiary
safeguards prohibiting the use of information obtained during the col-
laborative process may: (1) align the interests of the parties; (2) open
the parties to creative solutions to problems presented; and (3) provide
a "safe container" for negotiations.
1. Aligning the Interests of the Parties
Prior to beginning the collaborative process, collaborative lawyers
are advised to screen clients to be sure that they are proper candidates
for the procedure. 139 Such screening includes recognition by the col-
laborative attorney of certain characteristics in the client or the case
itself that make the client a good or bad candidate for the collaborative
process.' 4 ° During such a preliminary meeting, the collaborative attor-
ney assists the potential client in choosing which type of dispute reso-
lution works best for his or her case. 14 While describing each type of
dispute resolution to his or her client, the collaborative attorney illumi-
nates differences and similarities between the different options. 4 2 In a
jurisdiction that provides evidentiary safeguards for the communica-
tions made during the collaborative process, the collaborative attorney
should apprise the potential client of the prohibition against the use of
information offered during the collaborative process in any subse-
quent proceeding. Thus, the client is aware from the beginning that
anything he or she says during the collaborative process cannot be
used against him or her should the issue be litigated, unless he or she
consents or the information is obtained through formal discovery.
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2007).
137. Id.
138. TESLER, supra note 2, at 6; IACP Critique, supra note 57, at 2; Hoffman, supra
note 44, at 3; Voegele, supra note 50, at 978.
139. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 94-95 (providing screening guidelines for clients
wishing to use the collaborative process); Hoffman, supra note 44, at 3.
140. Characteristics to look for during screening include: whether there are
indications of spousal abuse between the client and his or her spouse, whether the
client has goals other than merely what he or she will receive quantitatively out of the
divorce settlement, etc. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 94-95.
141. See id. at 96-98.
142. Id.
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An agreement may still be created prior to the collaborative pro-
cess which outlines the clients' interests, such as the duty to negotiate
in good faith and the avoidance of litigation. However, instead of rely-
ing on the withdrawal agreement to prevent the parties from aban-
doning the negotiation process, collaborative practitioners can rely on
evidentiary safeguards to keep the parties from resorting to conven-
tional methods of divorce. The clients' common interests are furthered
by such rules because the clients will not censor their communications
out of fear it will be used against them later. 143
2. Opening the Parties up to Creative Solutions
Evidentiary safeguards effectively remove litigation from the nego-
tiation table. Collaborative practitioners claim that in order to provide
unique and creative settlements for their clients which, in the end,
result from compromise rather than battle, they must not be able to
consider litigation as an option for resolving the dispute.' 4 4 However,
relying on the withdrawal agreement to remove the option of litigation
is not entirely a solid premise. For example, the client still knows that
litigation is an option, just with a different attorney.' 45 Also, if the
collaborative attorney believes that litigation is in a particular client's
best interest, he or she is ethically bound to recommend litigation to
the client. 146 Therefore, despite the existence of a withdrawal agree-
ment, litigation is never completely "off the table."
Evidentiary safeguards in place during the collaborative process,
however, provide a huge disincentive for subsequent litigation. The
parties will have to expend even more resources and time on lengthy
discovery in order to be able to introduce at trial much of the informa-
143. See Strickland, supra note 11, at 1010.
144. See TESLER, supra note 2, at 16.
145. See id. at 7 (admitting that "the parties retain their right of access to the courts,
but if either party does resort to the courts for dispute resolution, both lawyers are
automatically disqualified from further representation of either of the parties against
the other").
146. According to the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Formal Opinion 07-447, "[a] lawyer who engages in collaborative
resolution processes still is bound by the rules of professional conduct, including the
duties of competence and diligence." Formal Op. 07-447, supra note 68, at 1.
Competent representation "requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). Therefore, it follows that to competently represent a client, a
collaborative attorney may at some point have to recommend litigation to such a
client.
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tion that was freely given during the collaborative proceeding.' 47 The
parties' lawyers will likewise have a great incentive to continue think-
ing of new ways to engage their clients in compromise. Without the
disqualification agreement, if the collaborative attorneys are not able to
get their clients to settle, they will be the ones doing the discovery
work in preparation for litigation.
3. Providing a "Safe Container" for Negotiations
By protecting the disclosures made during the collaborative pro-
cess, evidentiary safeguards surely create more of a "safe container"
than the withdrawal agreement. 148 As discussed above, the statutory
provisions bar the use of communications and information exchanged
during the collaborative process from use in subsequent litigation.
149
Thus, the clients can feel safe to freely and openly express themselves
and provide pertinent information on the issues at hand. 1 50 All that
the withdrawal agreement truly does to perpetuate the "safe container"
is to assure the party that the lawyer representing the opposing party
will not be the one who will later be using the statements made during
the collaborative process against him or her, should the issue go to
trial. Evidentiary safeguards put a clamp on using such statements in
subsequent litigation and, therefore, alleviate some of the apprehen-
sion that the party may have in disclosing potentially damaging
information.
CONCLUSION
While the collaborative process provides many benefits to clients
and collaborative attorneys alike,15' ethical questions have been raised
as to the role played by the disqualification agreement that many col-
laborative practitioners cite as the "heart" of the collaborative pro-
cess. 152 Rather than invoking such ethical inquiries, collaborative
practitioners and lawmakers should eliminate the requirement of with-
drawal agreements in the collaborative process. Statutes already in
147. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT § 7(c) (Tentative Draft Aug. 2007).
148. While collaborative practitioners may argue that the evidentiary safeguards
may contribute to the "safe" aspect of the "container," it is arguable that the
evidentiary provisions alone in fact create the feeling of safety. See generally Strickland,
supra note 11, at 1010 (discussing attributes of confidentiality and privilege provision
in collaborative law statutes).
149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-77 (2007).
150. See generally Strickland, supra note 11, at 1010.
151. See discussion, supra pp. 21-25.
152. See discussion, supra pp. 12-20.
[Vol. 30:363386
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss2/6
2008] WORKING AROUND THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT 387
place, such as North Carolina's General Statute Section 50-77, provide
evidentiary safeguards that protect collaborative clients from future
use of information communicated during the collaborative process.
These statutes also provide similar, if not identical, incentives to those
provided by the withdrawal agreement. In the interest of people like
Barbara and Jack, who would prefer to continue into litigation with
their original attorneys, it may be time to work around the withdrawal
agreement.
Jennifer M. Kuhn
25
Kuhn: Working Around the Withdrawal Agreement: Statutory Evidentiary Sa
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2008
